MM&N Commentary The surge in US casualties in Iraq is prompting the US government to reassess their war strategy. Between November and the State of the Union Address in January, we can anticipate a major policy shift in military strategy as well as the resignation of the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The public face to the White House's Iraq military plan is defined as "clear, hold, and build". It states the following assumptions: First, the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists do not have the manpower or firepower to achieve a military victory over the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. They can win only if we surrender. Second, our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq -- to fight terrorists while training and mentoring Iraqi forces -- until the mission is done, increasing or decreasing troop levels only as conditions warrant. Third, progress on the political front will improve the intelligence picture by helping distinguish those who can be won over to support the new Iraqi state from the terrorists and insurgents who must either be killed or captured, detained, and prosecuted. Fourth, the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq. Fifth, regional meddling and infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized. Sixth, while we can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term. The march of events have proved the fallacy of each of these assumptions. Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, who masterminded the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein, listed the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu among their favorite philosophers and quoted him lavishly. But I see little evidence that they have internalized his doctrine of war that stressed avoiding fixed campaign plans and promoting indirect means for achieving military domination. Mao was the greatest practioner of Sun Tzu's philosophy of war, as I mentioned in speculation on war plans on the eve of the Afghanistan war five years ago. If he were alive today, Sun Tzu would perhaps endorse the following: 1. Renounce the doctrine of regime change, which violates international law and the Just War theory and compels those in Iraq who hate us to die for their cause. Like a cornered rat, they have no other choice but to fight to the death and by so doing to kill as many of our troops as possible. A declaration of regime change creates fanaticism rather than moderation in our enemies. The demand for unconditional surrender was valid in World War II as we were operating under conditions of total war that required the total commitment of the nation. In the case of Iraq, it's impossible to reconcile the goal of total war to the limited and circumscribed means needed to achieve that goal. The renunciation of regime change as well as "shock and awe" counter-city warfare would have a considerable affirmative effect in removing the appeal and motivations of the dead-enders. 2. Renounce the "hold and build" portion of the military doctrine. The military's role should be one of defense or of punative action, not of nation building, something that Bush once rejected but now endorses. Our military resources are limited, and Camp Pendleton graduates shouldn't be asked to distribute candy and kittens to folks that would like to blow them up. The goal is to win. And if we cannot win, we need to get out. 3. Declare that our presence in Iraq is not oil-driven. The neo-cons once thought that oil revenues could pay for the war. But they also thought that our troops would be holding hands and singing Kumbayuh with the Saddamists. There are more than a dozen countries that are willing to give us all the oil we need currently at $60 per barrel. We don't need Iraq's oil, and our presence in Iraq has probably increased the price of oil. Our national interest is to stabalize oil prices by reducing our presence in that part of the world. Our need for oil is irrelevant in this conflict, although few people believe that. Thus, we need to turn over Iraqi oil resources to the Iraqis without regard to US commercial interests to demonstrate that there is no gap between word and deed. 4. Stand down in place all US troop forces. The current strategy of deploying troops within urban areas to hunt down terrorists sounds like the discredited Vietnam-era doctrine of search and destroy. Irrespective of so-called conditions on the ground, there must be a moritorium on the engagement of US troops in such actions to prevent further mutual slaughter. US troop actions clearly don't mitigate hostilities but to the contrary aggravate them by giving terrorists a reason for their existence. Troops will still need to protect the Green Zone, but beyond that there should be no engagement between US troops and hostile elements at all. This includes convoys as well as strategic infrastruure such as refineries and dams. Troop support needs to be reduced to a genuine advisor level capacity only. At present, there is no incentive of the Iraqis to wean themselves from US troop support, and nor will they. That needs to come to and end. 5. Transition troops to bases outside of Iraq, such as Quatar, while still maintaining a strong presence within Iraq. In the short-run, troops will need to be postioned for rapid deployment but not as an adjunct to the Iraqi forces. 6. Engage with all regional stakeholders without pre-condition. This includes our friends, such as Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the gulf states, our enemies, such as Iran and Syria, and those who are ambiguous in their loyalties, such as China and Russia. Given America's doctrine of regime change, Iran has an interest in ensuring that the US is in an endless quagmire that is Iraq, which they also continue their nuclear ambitions. China may also have an interest in maintaing the status quo. Some of the terrorists are proxies for the Syrians and the Iranians, and presently there isn't much we can do about that. By opening up multi-party talks, not just with the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, but with the Syrians, Iranians and others, incentive is given to those who oppose us to reduce hostilities while positioning themselves politically. Until a comprehensive political solution comes into play, the killings and the tribalism will continue. There cannot be a military solution without and before a political solution. In looking at this situation as an ethical proposition, one could argue that our unilateral evacuation is the best approach in that while many people will lose their lives in the short run, in the long run such a policy will allow the situation to work itself out under its own social and polticial dynamics. We are already enduring a blood bath, and the only question is: who's blood should be in that bath? I've no illusions that these policy shifts will occur. But war if nothing else teaches reality, and the reality that is emerging is that there are limits to what we can do and there are limits to the patience, treasure, and blood of the American people. Those realities-- not the half-baked intuitions of "the Decider"-- will drive the creation of a new and effective military doctrine.